从中国习近平主席近期的访美之行来看，两国领导人显然保持著良好的关系，这稳定了中美双方的相互立场——至少在特朗普政府的本届任期内是如此。
然而，无论两国领导人公开展现的个人关系如何，即使特朗普一直公开表示他与习近平保持著相互尊重的关系，并对此持乐观态度，真正塑造并决定美国对华外交政策的最重要力量，很大程度上并不受特朗普控制。
这些力量包括制度、先例以及正式程序。而主导这些力量的制度及其领导者，则受到自身利益、意识形态与地缘政治战略三者结合的驱动。
美国对华政策的主要制定者与推动力量包括：
国会作为结构性支柱：
美国两大政党都认为，对北京保持被动态度并不符合自身利益。在当今两极化的政治环境下，对华强硬政策可以带来选举优势，也能成为国内政治的头条新闻，因此，对共和党和民主党而言，采取鹰派立场在政治上仍然是最有利的选择。
这也解释了为何美国国会一再通过具有里程碑意义的两党立法——例如《晶片与科学法案》、不同版本的《国防授权法案》（NDAA），以及针对供应链、人权和台湾防卫能力的各项立法措施。这些立法不论执政的是哪一个政党，都会对行政政府形成约束，将对华措施转化为永久性的联邦法定义务。
国家安全体系与智库生态：
华盛顿的国家安全体系（包括五角大厦、国务院及情报界），以及主要外交政策智库，都将中国视为首要的战略竞争对手。这种观点建立在所谓的结构现实主义之上：当一个崛起中的大国（中国）逐渐接近主导霸权（美国）的实力水平时，无论领导人是谁，权力竞争都会加剧。
国会与国家安全体系则进一步借鉴以下智库的研究：
• 战略与国际研究中心（CSIS）：被广泛视为顶尖的安全与国防智库之一，CSIS设有“中国实力项目”，将中国视为对美国最具重大影响力的竞争者与敌手，并追踪中国的军事、经济及科技能力。该中心经常就两岸问题及印太威慑向美国政府及国会委员会提供简报。
• 外交关系协会（CFR）：这是一个具有精英色彩、无党派的会员组织，也是《外交事务》的出版机构，对高层外交政策论述具有重大影响力。该协会设有“中国战略倡议”及“中国政策加速器”等专门项目，分析美中在经济、政治及科技领域的竞争。
• 新美国安全中心（CNAS）：这是一家保守派／跨党派的国防与国家安全智库，在塑造美国科技安全思维方面具有重大影响，尤其涉及半导体出口管制、供应链韧性，以及对中国采取更具进攻性的国防战略。
• 布鲁金斯学会（Brookings Institution）：以中间派及主流政策分析著称，布鲁金斯学会就中国内政、全球经济治理及双边外交等议题，进行了大量研究。
• 传统基金会（The Heritage Foundation）与美国企业研究所（AEI）：两者都是保守派及鹰派智库中的主要力量，主张采取强硬威慑、切断关键供应链依赖，以及对中共采取更具进攻性的立场。
• 卡内基国际和平基金会（Carnegie Endowment for International Peace）：提供有关地缘战略、防扩散及国际秩序的全球研究，并经常主办美国及国际学者之间的非官方交流。
由此可见，美国对华政策主要是由一种结构性及制度性的共识所推动，而不是由个别总统的偏好所决定。
个别总统可以设定政策基调，但国会、精英制度网络及安全体系建立的政策基础设施，却会把美中政策锁定在一条长期的结构性轨道上。过去10年来，拜登和特朗普都依赖这套基础设施，使其政府任内出现的各种对华政策及计划得以迅速推进。
不过，两大影响美中政策的调节力量也显而易见。
第一股力量来自企业利益。从历史上看，美国跨国企业一直是推动美中积极接触最强大的倡导者。如今，对知识产权、国家补贴竞争以及供应链脆弱性的担忧，已促使部分企业领袖支持优先考虑经济“去风险化”及产业回流的政策。
第二股力量则与受到媒体强烈影响的民意有关。尽管近期民调显示，部分人口群体对中国的好感有所温和上升（尤其是年轻成年人及民主党支持者），但整体民意仍然以负面或谨慎态度为主，普遍共识仍然将中国视为主要经济及战略竞争对手。
尽管民意可能逐渐对中国采取更友善的态度，但由于外交政策与短期民意趋势之间存在隔离，制度性的政策预计仍将维持不变。事实上，过去美国对主要地缘政治竞争对手的外交政策，很少是由不断变化的民调所主导。精英制度的优先事项，例如军事准备、科技优势及战略威慑，一直凌驾于周期性的民意变化之上。
对中国外交政策困境的影响
这种根深蒂固的美国制度性共识，为北京制造了一个战略悖论，严重限制了中国的外交选项以及对和平的期待。
和解陷阱：
如果北京单方面作出让步，或者采取纯粹的和解姿态，美国的立法及制度框架仍然在法律上被锁定不变。在华盛顿，和解姿态往往被解读为施压策略正在奏效的证明。这反而会促使美方提出更多要求，而不是相应地取消关税或出口管制等措施。
防御性威慑：
由于中国外交政策制定者认为，美国的结构性敌意将跨越不同选举周期而持续存在，因此，北京更加重视国内自主能力（例如科技自主、经济双循环）以及更强大的区域联盟（如金砖国家、全球南方），而不是寻求与华盛顿进行根本性的重新调整。
针对性外交：
认识到华盛顿制度性立场根深蒂固，中国日益将外交努力集中于欧洲、亚洲及全球南方伙伴，以防止形成由美国领导的统一全球阵营，同时主要透过降低风险机制来管理中美关系，而不是寻求意识形态上的和解。
结论
美中之间的结构性摩擦，根源在于国际力量平衡的转变，而不是某一位领导人的个性。由于国会、安全机构及政策网络已经将这场竞争纳入法律及国家战略之中，因此，在可预见的未来，双边关系仍将受到地缘政治竞争的限制，这也使北京几乎没有理由或诱因寻求和解。
同样高度可能的是，随著中国经济及科技实力不断崛起，其在全球经济中的地位持续提升，美国的对华政策也将进一步强化。
林德宜《解析美国反华政策持久性》原文：Why United States Anti China Policy Will Continue
Judging from President Xi's recent United States visit, the two leaders clearly have a good relationship that has stabilized the position of China and the U.S. towards each other - at least for the current term of the Trump administration.
However, whatever appears as the public and personal relationship of the two leaders - a respectful connection that Trump has been open and optimistic about - the most important forces shaping and determining American foreign policy towards China are largely outside Trump's control.
These forces comprise institutions, precedents, and formal processes. Institutions and the individuals heading these forces are in turn driven by a combination of self interest, ideology and geopolitical strategy.
Key makers and drivers of the U.S. China policy include
Congress as the Structural Anchor:
Neither major political party sees it in their own interest to appear passive toward Beijing. In the polarized environment of today, hardline China policies provide electoral advantage and serve as a point of domestic political headline news, ensuring that hawkish positions remain politically optimal for both Republicans and Democrats.
This explains why Congress has routinely passed landmark, bi-partisan legislation—such as the CHIPS and Science Act, various iterations of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), and legislative measures targeting supply chains, human rights, and Taiwan defense capabilities. These legislative acts bind executive administrations regardless of party, turning anti-China measures into permanent federal statutory obligations.
The National Security Establishment & Think Tank Ecosystem:
Washington's national security apparatus (Pentagon, State Department, Intelligence Community) alongside major foreign policy think tanks treat China as a primary strategic peer threat. This perspective is grounded in what has been described as structural realism: when a rising power (China) approaches parity with a dominant hegemon (the US), power competition intensifies regardless of leadership.
Congress and the national security establishment in turn draw from the following think tanks
• Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS): Widely regarded as a top security and defense think tank, CSIS houses the China Power Project, which sees China as America's most consequential competitor and enemy and tracks Chinese military, economic,
and technological capabilities. It frequently briefs U.S. administrations and congressional committees on cross-strait issues and Indo-Pacific deterrence.
• Council on Foreign Relations (CFR): An elite, nonpartisan membership organization and publisher of Foreign Affairs, CFR heavily influences high-level foreign policy discourse. It runs specialized initiatives like the China Strategy Initiative and China Policy Accelerator to analyze U.S.–China competition across economic, political, and technological sectors.
• Center for a New American Security (CNAS): A conservative/bipartisan defense and national security think tank that heavily shapes modern U.S. thinking on techno-security, semiconductor export controls, supply chain resilience, and aggressive defense strategy relative to China.
• Brookings Institution: Known for centrist and mainstream policy analysis, Brookings produces extensive research on Chinese domestic politics, global economic governance, and bilateral diplomacy.
• The Heritage Foundation & American Enterprise Institute (AEI): Leading among conservative and hawk-leaning think tanks that advocate for hardline deterrence, decoupling of critical supply chains, and aggressive posture toward the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP).
• Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Offers global research on geostrategy, nonproliferation, and international order, often hosting track-2 dialogues between American and international scholars.
From this, it is clear that U.S. policy toward China is driven primarily by a structural and institutional consensus—rather than individual presidential preference.
While individual presidents can set the tone, Congress, elite institutional networks, and security establishments build the policy infrastructure that locks US–China policy into a long lasting structural trajectory. Both Biden and Trump have been reliant on this infrastructure to obtain rapid action on the proliferation of anti China policies and programmes that have appeared during their administrations in the last 10 years.
Two moderating forces influencing US China policy are discernible.
The first comprises corporate interests. Historically, American multinational corporations were the strongest advocates for positive U.S.–China engagement. Today, concerns over intellectual property, state-subsidized competition, and supply chain vulnerabilities have led some corporate leadership to support policies prioritizing economic "de-risking" and industrial reshoring.
The second relates to public opinion which is strongly shaped by the media. Although recent survey data shows modest upticks in favorable views among certain demographics (particularly younger adults and Democrats), overall public sentiment remains predominantly negative or cautious, with a broad consensus viewing China primarily as an economic and strategic competitor.
While public sentiment may shift more favourably towards China, institutional policy can be expected to remain unchanging due to how foreign policy is insulated from short-term public trends. It is a fact that past U.S. foreign policy toward major geopolitical rivals has been rarely dictated by shifting public opinion polls. Elite institutional priorities—such as military
readiness, technological supremacy, and strategic deterrence— have always overridden cyclical public shifts.
Impact on China's Foreign Policy Dilemma
This entrenched U.S. institutional consensus creates a strategic paradox for Beijing, severely constraining its diplomatic options and hopes of peace.
The Conciliation Trap:
If Beijing offers unilateral concessions or attempts a purely conciliatory posture, U.S. legislative and institutional frameworks remain legally locked in place. In Washington, conciliatory gestures are often interpreted as proof that pressure tactics are working. This prompts further demands rather than reciprocal unwinding of tariffs or export controls for example.
Defensive Deterrence:
Because Chinese foreign policymakers calculate that U.S. structural hostility will persist across electoral cycles, Beijing prioritizes domestic self-reliance (e.g., tech independence, economic dual circulation) and stronger regional coalitions (BRICS, Global South) rather than seeking a fundamental reset with Washington.
Targeted Diplomacy:
Recognizing the entrenched nature of Washington's institutional position, China has increasingly focused its diplomatic efforts on European, Asian, and Global South partners to prevent the formation of a unified global bloc led by the U.S., while managing the U.S. relationship primarily through risk-reduction mechanisms rather than ideological reconciliation.
Conclusion
The structural friction between the U.S. and China is rooted in the shift of international power balances rather than the personality of a single leader. Because Congress, security institutions, and policy networks have codified this rivalry into law and national strategy, the bilateral dynamic will remain constrained by geopolitical competition for the foreseeable
future—leaving Beijing with little reason or incentive to pursue conciliation.
It is highly likely too that there will be an intensification of American anti China policies as China's economic and technology rise and position in the global economy continues unabated.
本文观点，不代表《东方日报》立场
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